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Investment and Inequality in Africa: which financial channels are good for 
the poor?
Abstract
This  paper  examines  how domestic,  foreign,  private  and  public  investments  affect 
income-inequality  through financial  intermediary  dynamics  of  depth,  efficiency,  activity  and 
size.  With  the  exception  of  financial  allocation  efficiency,   financial  channels  of  depth  and 
activity are good for the poor as they diminish estimated household income-inequality. Financial 
size does not have a significant income-redistributive effect. Financial allocation efficiency has a 
disequalizing effect on income-distribution; implying policies designed to improve the allocation 
of mobilized funds to economic agents only benefit the rich to the detriment of the poor. The use  
of financial and investment dimensions previously missing in the literature provide new insights 
into the  two  contrasting  theories in the finance-inequality nexus. 
JEL Classification: D60; E25; G20; I30; O55
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1. Introduction
Poverty  and  inequality  undoubtedly   remain  important  challenges  to   economic  and 
human developments. Over the past three decades, investment rates have fallen considerably in 
majority of African countries(Ndikumana, 2002). This decrease in investment is a major cause 
for worry, given the close connection between the level of investment and the rate of economic 
growth(Barro,1991;  Ben-David,  1998).  Financial  repression  and  its  pervasiveness  of  stifling 
economic growth have been elaborately covered by a substantial bulk of literature( McKinnon, 
1973; Shaw,1973). In the 1980s and 1990s, most  African countries embarked on a series of 
structural and policy adjustments in the financial sector as part of economic reforms with the 
goal of given impetus to economic growth as well as improving overall economic and financial 
efficiency(Janine & Elbadawi, 1992). Hitherto, owing to scarcity and lack of relevant data on 
income-inequality for  Africa, only two studies to the best of our knowledge have addressed the 
finance-inequality nexus in the continent(Kai & Hamori,2009; Batuo et al.,2010)
In the light of the above points, drawing from the experience of  a continent that has been 
implementing development financial reforms, this study aims to assess the income-redistributive 
effects of investment  through financial intermediary channels of depth, efficiency, activity and 
size in Africa. In particular, the paper seeks to investigate how financial development impacts 
income-inequality, conditional on domestic, foreign, private and public investments.  The main 
contributions of this work to finance and economic literature are the following: (1)an assessment of  
why  income-inequality in Africa has remained stubbornly high, in spite of more than two decades of 
economic  and  financial  reforms;  (2)  contrary  to  mainstream finance-growth  literature  this  work 
improves the employment of financial indicators  by using financial intermediary dynamics of depth,  
efficiency, activity and size in the assessment of the impact of finance on income-inequality; (3) we 
innovate the income-finance literature by introducing a previously missing  investment dimension 
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into the debate, where-in the inequality-finance nexus is contingent on aggregate domestic, foreign,  
private and public investment dynamics. 
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  organized  in  the  following  manner.  Section  2  discusses 
existing  literature.  Data  and  Methodology  are  described  and  outlined  in  Section  3  respectively.  
Empirical analysis and discussion of results are reported in Section 4. We conclude with Section 5. 
2. Existing Literature 
2.1 Theoretical highlights
 
A bulk of empirical  research has  given substantial  support  to  the view that  financial 
development has a significant effect on the pattern of income distribution, more precisely that it  
either reduces or enhances inequality depending on theoretical postulations. Hence two strands 
of  theories have been developed that provide contrasting views on the income-redistributive 
impact of finance .
Some protagonists posit an inverted U-shaped link between financial development and 
inequality.  For  instance,  Greenwood  and  Jovanovic(1990)  study  on  the  finance-growth-
inequality nexus predicts a Kuznets curve relationship between finance and inequality.  In the 
early stages of development, when the financial sector is underdeveloped, inequality augments 
with  financial  development.  Conversely,  this  positive  impact  on  inequality  reduces  as  the 
economy  develops  ;  moving  to  the  intermediate  phase  and  then  to  the  mature  phase  of 
development  where-in  agents  would  see  their  incomes  increase  as  they  gain  access  to  the 
financial intermediary sector. In plainer terms, in the  transition from a primitive slow-growing 
economy to a developed fast growing one, a nation passes via a stage in which the distribution of 
wealth across the rich and poor stretches. 
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On  the  other  hand  some  authors  suggest  a  linear  relationship  between  financial 
development and income-inequality(Banerjee & Newman, 1993; Galor & Zeira, 1993). Their 
basic  theoretical  assumption  is  that  financial  market  imperfections  such  as  financial 
asymmetries, transaction and contract enforcement costs could be very binding on the poor who 
are deficient of the collaterals, credit histories and  relational networks. Thus, even when the 
poor have projects with high returns, they may still be credit rationed, which infringes on the 
efficiency  of  capital  allocation  and  limits  the  social  mobility  of  the  poor.  Under  these 
circumstances,  income  inequality  rises  with  financial  development.  Conversely,  increasing 
capital allocation efficiency would reduce income-inequality by facilitating funding to the poor 
individuals with productive investment. 
2.2 Finance and inequality
 The  relationship  between  finance  and  inequality  can  be  classified  into  three  main 
strands. 
The first strand explores the link among financial development, growth and inequality. 
Undernourishment(Claessens & Feijen, 2006), population with lower income (Beck et al.,2007) 
decrease with financial development. One particular interesting characteristic in this category is 
the  debate  on  the  benefits  of  financial  development.  Some  proponents  asserts  that  financial 
imperfections  such  as  information  and  transaction  costs  are  binding  on  the  poor(who  lack 
collaterals  and  credit  histories)  and  thus  a  relaxation  of  these  credit  constraints  will 
disproportionately benefit the poor. It follows that improvement of capital allocation efficiency 
would  reduce  income-inequality  by facilitating  funding to   poor  individuals  with  productive 
investment( Galor & Zeira, 1993; Aghion & Bolton, 1997; Galor & Moay, 2004). In contrasts, 
some theories  postulate  that  financial  development  primarily  helps  the  rich.  In  a  non linear 
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relationship between finance, income-inequality and economic growth developed by Greenwood 
and Javanovic(1990)  financial  development  does  not  benefit  the  poor  at  the tender  stage  of 
development.
In the second strand we find literature that addresses unequal access to and usage of 
finance. Whereas in developed countries, more than 90% of households have access to financial 
services,  access to retail banking services is minimal in the poorer segments of the population in 
undeveloped countries, with fewer than one-quarter of households having access to even basic 
banking services(Honohan,2006). Low usage in lower income countries derives in part from low 
banking sector outreach. As regards the second dimension of this strand(access to finance), it is 
important here to distinguish between financial depth and access to finance. As pointed out by 
Claessens & Perotti (2007), numbers on the size of loans and deposits per capita are substantially 
higher  in lower income countries than in their higher income counterparts. The higher average 
loan and deposit values in lower income countries suggest that usage of formal banking services 
is limited to firms and the relatively rich households. 
In  the  third  strand,  we find  papers  on  the  effects  of  inequality  in  access  to  finance. 
Absence  of  equal  opportunities  in  access  to  finance  may  result  in  corruption(Berger  & 
Udell,1998),  slower  firm  growth(Ayyagari  et  al.,2006;  Beck  et  al.,2005),  reduction  in 
entrepreneurial  activities  and  lack  of  convergence  in  growth  rates  between  rich  and  poor 
countries(Banerjee & Duflo, 2005), diminish individual welfare gains such as reduction in the 
prevalence  of hunger,  poor  health,  low education  and gender  inequality(Claessens  & Feijen, 
2007). 
We have analyzed available evidence that financial access is quite skewed and affects 
competition,  individual  welfare  and  enterprise  growth.  The  absence  of  diffused  access  can 
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undermine  growth, reduce welfare and create  vulnerability to  financial  meltdown.  It  may be 
interesting  to  investigate  why financial  sector  reforms  have  not  been  targeted  at  improving 
access to financing. The second category of the literature  investigates this concern with natural 
and political views.
2.3  Why  inequality in access to finance?
Hitherto, we have seen that financial systems provide unequal access to households and 
firms.  For  the  purpose  of  clarity,  motives  for  unequal  access  to  finance  could  be  naturally 
economic or due to political influences.
Natural economic reasons like natural high fixed cost in offering financial  services or 
walls created by entry regulations that serve a valid public good(e.g. identification requirements 
for opening up a bank account  to maintain  financial  integrity).  It  is  due to financial  market 
frictions that the poor cannot invest in their education despite their high marginal productivity of 
investment(Galor & Zeira, 1993; Banerjee & Newman, 1993).
Unequal  access  can  also  results  from  political  influence  which  creates  regulatory 
obstacles  to  protect  established  rents(  Rajan  & Zingales,  2003;  Acemoglu  et  al.,2005).  This 
implies countries with poor political institutions, naturally leads to unequal political influence. 
Powerful groups will impact the regulatory and judicial environment and frequently control the 
allocation of finance(directly via bank ownership or through political networking). 
 
2.4 The experience and lessons of financial reform
For clarity of purpose it is worthwhile classifying literature on financial reform (in the 
context of inequality and resulting lessons) into three main strands.
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In the first strand, we find studies focused on the timing and  experience of financial 
liberalization  in  developing  and developed countries  over  the  past  two decades(Henry,2003; 
Chinn  &  Ito,2006).  We  find  evidence  especially  at  individual  firm  level,  that  domestic 
deregulation and liberalization have augmented the supply of domestic capital,  attracted foreign 
capital, led to more relaxed financial constraints…etc. All these have led to increased investment 
and  growth.  Capital  market  liberalization  specifically  has  been  found  to  averagely  have 
appealing  effects  on  growth,  asset  allocation  and  efficiency(Levine  and  Zervros,1996; 
Henry,2000a; Henry,2000b; Henry,2006). 
The second strand focuses on literature pertaining to asset allocation, rents, and growth 
opportunities. Here-in, we find works substantiating that, reforms often benefit insiders through 
preferential  allocation  of  assets,  rents  and  growth  opportunities.  The  cases  of  Chile  in  the 
1970s(Velasco,  1988;  Valdes-Prieto,1992),  Mexico  in  the  1980s(Haber  & Kantor,  2004;  La 
Porta et al.,2003; Haber et al.,2003) and Russia in the 1990s( Claessens & Pohl,1995; Perotti, 
2002) point to the  fact that privatization of state owned banks benefit groups of insiders. We 
also find evidence of preferential  allocation of licenses to a few insiders(Clarke et  al.,2003), 
benefits of stock market liberalization that have been directed only to the top quintile of the 
income  distribution(Das  and  Mohapatra,2003),  listing  and  corporate  governance  rules  often 
designed to help insiders(Khwaja & Mian, 2005) and last but not the least, poor regulation and 
weak  enforcement  in  the  liberalization  markets  allowed  insiders  ample  space  for  the 
expropriation of minority shareholders(La Porta et al.,2000; Claessens et al.,2002). In this strand 
we also find evidence that, while financial openness generally improves capital allocation and 
investment at the micro level(Henry,2003),it does not necessarily translate into higher economic 
growth at the aggregate level.
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In the third strand, we find literature on allocation of risks created by financial reforms. 
Bank crises can be socialized(Dooley,2000) and typically increase inequality(Galbraith & Lu, 
1999). Financial  crises also benefit the lower-income strata through looting by the poor who 
have  nothing to lose(Akerlof & Romer,  1993). In the redistributive impact of crisis through 
politics, Glaeser et al.(2003) argue that in many countries, the political response to institutional 
subversion by the rich is not institutional  reform, but rather a form of massive Robin Hood 
redistribution. In some cases, this backlash slows economic and social progress on the one  hand 
and on the other hand, the effect could simply be a change in the elite. In many cases reforms are 
often opportunistic, geared towards political ends especially during elections(Dinc,2004; Brown 
& Dinc,2004). 
2.5 Finance and Inequality in Africa
Studies  on the finance-inequality  nexus are  relatively absent  in the context  of Africa 
owing  to scarcity and lack of relevant data on inequality. In a first detailed econometric analysis, 
Kai and Hamori(2009) examine the relationship between financial deepening and inequality in 
sub-Saharan  Africa  between  1980  and  2002  and  find  that  financial  depth  helps  reduced 
inequality. 
 Batuo et al.(2010) assess how financial development is related to income distribution in 
a panel of 22 African countries for the period  between 1990 and 2004. Using a dynamic panel 
estimation technique(GMM), findings indicate that income-inequality decreases as economies 
develop their financial sectors. They are consistent with the bulk  of theoretical and empirical 
research  and  find  no  evidence  supporting  the  Greenwood-Javanovic(1990)  hypothesis  of  an 
inverted U-Shaped relationship between financial development and income-inequality. 
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As we must have emphasized earlier the main contributions of this paper to the finance and 
economic  literature  are  the  following:  (1)an  assessment  of  why income-inequality  in  Africa  has 
remained stubbornly high, in spite of more than two decades of economic and financial reforms; (2)  
contrary to mainstream finance-growth literature1 this work improves the employment of financial 
indicators by using financial  intermediary dynamics of depth, efficiency,  activity and size in the 
assessment  of  the  impact  finance  on  income-inequality;  (3)  we  innovate  the  inequality-finance 
literature  by introducing an investment  dimension into the debate,  where-in the  income-finance  
nexus is contingent on aggregate domestic, foreign, private and public investment dynamics. 
The following testable hypotheses will guide the empirical section of the paper.
Hypothesis 1 : Financial depth is good for the poor.
Hypothesis 2 : Financial allocation efficiency is instrumental to the poor2.
Hypothesis 3 : Financial activity helps the poor.
Hypothesis 4 :  Financial size  decreases income-inequality. 
3.  Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
We examine a  sample  of  13 African  countries(Algeria,  Botswana,  Cameroon,  Egypt, 
Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and Uganda) 
with data obtained from African Development Indicators(ADI) and the Financial Development 
1 This is the first empirical study to investigate the finance-inequality nexus with financial intermediary dynamics of  
depth, efficiency, activity and size. In an African context, while Kai and Hamori(2009) use only financial depth,  
Batuo  et  al.(2010)  use  both  financial  depth  and  financial  activity.  To  these  variables  we  introduce  alternative 
indicators of financial depth and financial activity for robustness purposes on the one hand, and on the other hand 
further  our analysis  with other  dynamics  of  financial  development(banking efficiency,  financial  efficiency,  and 
financial size). 
2 Some proponents in the literature  assert that financial imperfections such as information and transaction cost are  
binding on the poor(who lack collateral and credit histories) and thus a relaxation of these credit constraints will  
disproportionately  benefit  the  poor.  It  follows  that  improvement  of  capital  allocation  efficiency  would  reduce 
income-inequality by facilitating funding to poor individuals with productive investment( Galor  & Zeira,  1993; 
Aghion & Bolton, 1997; Galor & Moay, 2004).
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and Structure Database(FDSD) of the World Bank(WB). Owing to  scares inequality data for 
the African continent from WDI, we borrow from  Kai and Hamori (2009) in using estimated 
household  income  inequality  data  obtained  from  the  University  of  Texas  Inequality 
Project(UTIP). The sample of countries are those for which data is available from UTIP and 
those that have not experienced a civil war during the period 1980-2002. The time interval also 
coincides  with  two  decades  of  financial  and economic  reforms  in  the  African  continent.  A 
synthesis of selected variables is found in Appendix 3.  For the purpose of clarity, this data is 
classified into the following categories.
3.1.1 Financial development indicators
a) Financial depth
While recent  finance-inequality literature  has either not used financial  depth(Beck et 
al.,2004; Beck et al.,2007)  or  focused only on a single measure of finance( Kai & Hamori,  
2009;Batuo et al.,2010), we borrow from  Beck et al.(1999) and Asongu(2011a) and  proxy for 
financial depth both from  overall-economic and financial system perspectives by indicators of 
broad money supply (M2/GDP) and financial system deposits (Fdgdp) respectively. While the 
first represents the monetary base plus demand, saving and time deposits, the second denotes 
liquid liabilities. The two variables are  in ratios of GDP(see Appendix 3) and  should robustly 
check each other as either accounts for over 97% of information in the other (see Appendix 2).
b) Financial efficiency
The  concept  of  efficiency  here  is  neither  profitability-oriented  nor  guided  by  the 
production efficiency of decision making units in the financial sector (via Data Envelopment 
Analysis: DEA). What this paper is concerned with is the ability of banks to effectively fulfill  
their fundamental role of transforming mobilized deposits into credit for economic operators. We 
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use   measures for banking-system-efficiency and financial-system-efficiency (respectively ‘bank 
credit on bank deposits: Bcbd’ and ‘financial system credit on financial system deposits: Fcfd’). 
Like  in  the  case  of  financial  depth,  these  two financial  allocation(intermediation)  efficiency 
proxies can check each other as they represent more than 88% of variability in one another (see 
Appendix 2).
c) Financial size
Consistent with the FDSD we measure financial intermediary size as the ratio of “deposit 
bank assets” to the “total assets” (deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank 
assets: Dbacba). Unfortunately, we could not find another indicator of financial size despite a 
thorough search, numerous computations and deepened correlation analyses.
d) Financial activity
Financial  intermediary  activity  here  refers  to  the  ability  of  banks  to  grant  credit  to 
economic operators: consistent with some motives of financial reforms which sought to stimulate 
investment.  While  past  works  highlighted  in  the  literature   have  focused  only  on  a  single 
measure(Beck et al.,2004; Beck et al.,2007;Batuo et al.,2010)  we proxy for both  bank-sector-
activity  and financial-sector-activity with “private domestic credit by deposit banks: Pcrb” and 
“private credit by domestic banks and other financial institutions: Pcrbof” respectively. The later 
indicator checks the former as it represents more than 91% of information in the former (see 
Appendix 2).
3.1.2 Investment instrumental variables
The paper  uses  Gross  Domestic  Investment,  Foreign Direct  Investment,  Gross Public 
Investment  and  Gross  Private  Investment  as  instrumental  variables.  The  choice  of  these 
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instrumental variables is premised on the finance-inequality literature, where-in financial reforms 
were investment-targeted. 
3.1.3 Control Variables
In line with the finance-growth(Levine & King, 1993; Hassan et al., 2011) and finance-
inequality(Dollar & Kraay,  ;Beck et al.,2007; Kai and Hamori, 2009)  literature, we control for 
trade, inflation, population growth, government expenditure and GDP growth.
3.1.4  Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis
Descriptive  statistics  and  correlation  analysis  are  represented  in  Appendix  1  and 
Appendix 2 respectively.  From the descriptive statistics,  it  could be noted that an estimation 
approach  that  directly  assumes  a  particular  form of  distribution  is  inappropriate  and  would 
produce biased  and inconsistent  estimates.   As for  the  correlation  analysis,  it  has  two main 
objectives.  On  the  one  hand  it  enables  us  avoid  issues  linked  to  multicolinearity  and 
overparametization. On the other hand, it provides us with a foresight on possible linkage-signs 
between  various  indicators.  Among  them,  it  is  worth  noting  that   all  correlations  with  the 
variable of interest have the right signs. While  inflation and  population growth are positively 
correlated  with  inequality,  the  remaining  variables  are  negatively  correlated  with  it.  These 
negative  relations  are  consistent  with  theory  in  the  perspective  that  aggregate 
investment(domestic, foreign, private and public) measures designed to improve services in the 
financial sector(depth, efficiency, activity and size), and control variables(trade and government 
expenditure) all have an appealing redistributive impact on household income. As for inflation 
and  population  growth,  they  decrease  purchasing  power  and  household  income  per  capita 
respectively; in line with their positive association with the variable of interest.  
13
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Endogeneity
Though the lack of financial access has long been recognized as the leading cause of 
persisting inequality,  Claessens & Perotti(2007) have urged the need to recognize the reverse 
effect as well. They borrow from Acemoglu & Robison (2005) in highlighting that inequality 
affects financial development and in particular the distribution of access, because unequal access 
to  resources  affects  de  facto  political  power.  Consistent  with  the  literature(  Rajan  & 
Zingales,2003; and Perotti & Volpin, 2007) in a weak institutional framework where de facto 
political  influence  dominates  de  jure  political  representation,  inequality  renders  it  easy  for 
established interests to influence access to finance by direct control or regulatory ‘kidnapping’ of 
the financial system.   
3.2.2 Estimation technique 
Borrowing from Beck et al.(2003) we employ the Two-Stage-Least Squares(TSLS) with 
investment  dynamics  as  instrumental  variables.  As  we  have  highlighted  earlier,  the  paper 
requires  an  estimation  technique  that  takes  account  of  endogeneity.  The  Instrumental 
Variable(IV) estimator can avoid the bias that Ordinary Least Squares(OLS) estimates suffer-
from(absence of consistency) when independent variables in the regression are correlated with 
the error term in the equation of interest. Another important aspect worth point-out is the close 
relation between investment and finance in effects of financial reforms; which provides another 
justification for the use of aggregate investment dynamics as instruments. Thus the IV model 
investigates  if  domestic,  foreign,  private  and  public  investments  affect  income-inequality 
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through financial channels of depth, efficiency, activity and size. In line with Asongu(2011bd) 
TSLS process involves the following steps:
-justify  the  use  of  a  TSLS  over  an  OLS  estimation  technique  via  the  Hausman-test  for 
endogeneity;
-show  that  instrumental  variables  (aggregate  investment  dynamics  )  are  exogenous  to  the 
endogenous  components  of  explaining  variables  (financial  channels),  conditional  on  other 
covariates(control variables);
-verify  if  the  investment-instruments  are  valid  and not  correlated  with  the  error-term in  the 
equation of interest through an Over-identifying restrictions (OIR) test. 
Thus our methodology will include the following models:
First-stage regression: 
++= itit DomestichannelFinancialC )(10 γγ +itForeign)(2γ itivate)(Pr3γ                        (1)
                               itPublic)(4γ υα ++ itiX
Second-stage regression:
++= itit hannelFinancialCInequality )(10 γγ +itiXβ µ                                                          (2) 
In the two equations,  X is a set of exogenous variables that are included in first-stage 
regressions. For the first and second equations,  v  and u, respectively denote the error terms. 
Instrumental variables are the four aggregate investment variables.  
3.2.3 Robustness of results
To assess the robustness of our results we: (1) use Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation 
Consistent(HAC) standard error regressions in every model; (2) control for the consistency of 
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financial channels with alternative indicators; (3) check restricted with unrestricted regressions at 
the Second-stage of the TSLS approach. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
This section presents the results from cross-country regressions to  assess the importance 
of aggregate investment dynamics in the effectiveness of financial channels and  the ability of 
the exogenous components of financial channels to explain cross-country differences in income-
inequality  conditional on investment dynamics(instruments). 
4.1 Finance and Investment
In Table 1, we regress the financial indicators on domestic, foreign, private and public 
investments conditional on control variables and also test for their joint significance. 
Table 1: First-stage regressions 
Dependent Variables: Financial  Development
Financial Depth Financial  Efficiency Financial Activity Financial  Size
M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba Dbacba
Model 1 Model 1* Model 2 Model 2* Model 3 Model 3* Model 4 Model 4*
Constant 0.476*** 0.411*** 1.049*** 1.166*** 0.308*** 0.430*** 0.563*** 0.605***
(8.566) (8.311) (13.19) (10.91) (7.121) (6.125) (15.00) (9.272)
Instruments
Domestic 0.008*** --- 0.003 --- 0.006*** --- 0.006*** ---
(4.571) (0.990) (4.034) (3.363)
Foreign -0.010** -0.009** -0.032*** -0.038*** -0.011** -0.015** -0.002 0.010*
(-2.057) (-2.132) (-2.926) (-2.737) (-2.516) (-2.241) (-0.511) (1.848)
Private --- 0.005*** --- 0.008 --- 0.007** --- 0.007***
(2.631) (1.475) (2.473) (3.492)
Public 0.008*** 0.010*** -0.021*** -0.029*** -0.003 -0.004 -0.008*** -0.003
(2.811) (4.036) (-3.399) (-4.033) (-1.223) (-1.291) (-3.069) (-1.148)
Control 
Variables
Trade --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.002*** ---
(8.588)
Inflation -0.001** -0.0009** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.002*** ---
(-2.369) (-2.100) (-3.550) (-2.848) (-2.835) (-2.019) (-4.903)
Popg -0.084*** -0.085*** --- --- -0.048*** -
0.054***
--- -0.069***
(-6.747) (-7.609) (-4.621) (-3.404) (-5.659)
G.E -0.006** --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.014***
(-2.457) (5.038)
GDPg --- --- -0.016*** -0.022*** -0.007*** -
0.009***
-0.006** ---
(-2.901) (-3.166) (-3.052) (-2.683) (-2.497)
Fisher-test 21.652*** 22.173*** 10.187*** 11.394*** 13.714*** 8.814*** 25.675*** 17.951***
Adjusted R² 0.324 0.292 0.154 0.169 0.233 0.154 0.390 0.266
Number of Observations 259 257 253 256 251 258 232 234
Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on Central bank assets plus Deposit bank assets. Popg: Population growth rate. GDPg: GDP growth rate. 
G.E: Government Expenditure . *,**,***: Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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It is worth noting this is the first-step of the TSLS approach where-in, the instruments must  
explain  the  endogenous  components  of  the  financial  channels,  conditional  on  other 
covariates(control variables). After controlling for trade,  inflation,  population growth, general 
government  expenditure  and  GDP  growth,  we  find  that  investment  dynamics  enter  jointly 
significantly in all regressions at the 1% level. This Fisher test results also reflect the strength of 
our instruments. We avoid introducing domestic  and private investments in the same regression 
because both reflect the same information or variability at the height of  over 58%.
4.2 Inequality and Finance 
Table 2 addresses two main issues: (1) the concern of whether the exogenous components 
of financial channels explain inequality conditional on investment dynamics and; (2) whether 
only the  exogenous  components  of  financial  channels   explain  inequality  conditional  on 
aggregate  investment  dynamics.  In  other  words,  the  second  concern  seeks  to  assess  if  the 
income-redistributive  impact  of  investment  goes  beyond  financial  channels.  To  make  these 
assessments  we use the  TSLS regressions  with investment  instrumental  variables  .  Thus we 
integrate  equation (2) into the first-stage regressions (first  equation).  While  the first  issue is 
addressed  by  the  significance  of  estimated  coefficients,  the  second  is  investigated  by  the 
overidentifying  restrictions  (OIR)  test  whose  null  hypothesis  posits  that,  the  instruments 
(aggregate  investments)  are  not  correlated  with  the  error  term  of  the  equation  of  interest 
(equation 2).Therefore, a rejection of the null hypothesis of the OIR test is a rejection of the 
position that only financial channels explain inequality  conditional on investment.  Robustness 
checks are done at three stages: (1) the use of alternative indicators of each financial dynamic;  
(2) the application of alternative models with Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent 
Standard  Errors(HAC)   captured  by  models  with  the  “*”  sign;  (3)  introduction  of  an(a) 
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autonomous(constant)   financial  development  measure  in  the  regressions  when the  OIR test 
rejects its null hypothesis.   
Table 2 shows restricted TSLS inequality regressions.   We first and foremost  justify our 
choice of a TSLS estimation method with a  Hausman test  for model  specification.  The null 
hypothesis  of this  test  is  the  position  that  estimated  coefficients  by OLS are not  consistent; 
implying  they  suffer  from endogeneity  because  the  explaining  variables  in  the  equation  of 
interest  are  correlated  with  the  error  term.  Where  the  Hausman  test  fails  to  reject  the  null 
hypothesis  (absence  of  endogeneity)  we  do  not  consider   the  TSLS  estimation  method 
appropriate because estimates by OLS are efficient and consistent. OLS regressions show strong 
evidence  of  endogeneity  in  all  eight  models.  Depending  on  the  nature  of  identification 
(difference between instruments and endogenous regressors) we report the weak instrument test 
of first-stage regressions with Cragg-Donald statistics. 
The  first  issue  is  addressed  by  the  significance  of  financial  channel  estimated 
coefficients.  Financial  depth  from  overall  economic(monetary  base)   and  financial  system 
(liquid liabilities) perspectives is a significant determinant of inequality in estimate household 
income:  Model  5  and  Model  6(6*)  respectively.  This  significance  also  applies  to  financial 
efficiency from the banking system(Models 5,5* & 7)  and financial system(Models 6,6* & 8) 
standpoints. Financial activity through banking system activity(Models 7 & 7*) and financial 
system activity(Models 8 & 8*) also has an income redistributive effect. The added significance 
of the financial size channel(Model 7,7*,8, & 8*) shows that all financial intermediary dynamics 
under consideration address the first issue. With regard to the second concern, rejection of the 
null  hypothesis  of  the  OIR test  in  all  eight  regressions  demonstrates  that  not  only financial 
channels  explain  income-inequality  conditional  on  investment  aggregates.  In  other  words, 
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investment  dynamics  exert  an  influence  on  inequality  through  other  mechanisms  beyond 
financial channels. We have found that the instruments are correlated with the error term in the 
equation  of  interest;  implying  investment  dynamics  do not  address  the  issue of  endogeneity 
(which  the  financial  channels  suffer-from).  The  presence  of  biased  estimates  owing  to 
endogeneity could further be confirmed by the signs of estimated coefficients. At least judging 
from empirical  literature,  we expected  negative  signs  for  the financial  depth  channel(Kai  & 
Hamori, 2009;Batuo et al.,2010); as is the case of financial activity (Beck et al.,2004; Beck et  
al.,2007;Batuo  et  al.,2010).  As  for  financial  efficiency  and  size,  we  cannot  establish  with 
certainty which sign is right as this paper is the first to use them in finance-inequality literature. 
However, borrowing from initial correlation analysis we expected their corresponding estimates 
to display negative signs. Given the invalidity of the instruments, biased estimated coefficients 
and absence of additional financial channels to consider, we relax the restricted assumption of 
the TSLS approach in Table 2 and assume the presence of a(an) constant(autonomous) finance: 
hence an unrestricted TSLS approach captured in Table 3.
Table 2: Restricted Second-Stage regressions with HAC
Dependent Variables:  Estimated Household Income Inequality
Model 5 Model 5* Model 6 Model 6* Model 7 Model 7* Model 8 Model 8*
Financial 
Depth
Monetary Base(M2) 39.58*** 39.584 --- --- --- --- --- ---
(4.00) (1.29)
Liquid liabilities(Fdgdp) --- --- 63.74*** 63.748* --- --- --- ---
(5.059) (1.685)
Financial 
Efficiency
Banking  System  Efficiency 35.46*** 35.46*** --- --- 21.09*** 21.09 --- ---
(BcBd) (7.918) (2.602) (3.353) (1.291)
Financial  System Efficiency --- --- 27.06*** 27.06** --- --- 30.13*** 30.13
(FcFd) (6.368) (1.964) (3.149) (1.249)
Financial 
Activity
Banking System Activity --- --- --- --- -83.74*** -83.74*** --- ---
(Pcrb) (-4.585) (-3.570)
Financial  System  Activity --- --- --- --- --- --- -140*** -140.8**
(Pcrbof) (-3.06) (-2.025)
Financial
Size
Dbacba --- --- --- --- 64.19*** 64.19*** 80.00*** 80.00**
(7.504) (3.251) (5.201) -2284
Hausman test 595.00*** 595.00*** 898.07*** 898.0*** 399.14** 399.14*** 626.46*** 626.4***
OIR(Sargan) test 36.64*** 36.64*** 25.78*** 25.78*** 27.07*** 27.07*** 4.683* 4.683*
P-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.096] [0.096]
Cragg-Donald 9.285 --- 10.88 --- 6.478 --- 1.343 ---
Adjusted R² 0.093 0.093 0.084 0.084 0.086 0.086 0.091 0.091
F-Statistics --- --- --- --- 763.3*** 107.56*** 258.50*** 25.70***
Observations 213 213 216 216 191 191 196 196
():  z-statistics.  Chi-square  statistics  for  Hausman  test.  LM statistics  for  Sargan  test.  [  ]:p-values.  Cragg-Donald  Weak  Instrument  test.  *,  **,  ***:  
significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on Central bank assets plus Deposit bank assets. Models with the “*” are 
in Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent standard errors(HAC).
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 Table 3: Unrestricted Second-Stage regressions with HAC
Dependent Variables:  Estimated Household Income Inequality
Model 9 Model 9* Model 10 Model 10* Model 11 Model 11* Model 12 Model 12*
Constant 56.78*** 56.78*** 55.95*** 55.95*** 46.40*** 46.40*** 41.04*** 41.04***
(17.33) (9.093) (15.15) (7.155) (12.03) (8.026) (5.265) (3.076)
Financial 
Depth 
Monetary Base -18.71*** -18.71*** --- --- --- --- --- ---
(-4.661) (-3.081)
Liquid liabilities --- --- -26.86*** -26.86 --- --- --- ---
(-3.885) (-2.560)
Financial 
Efficiency
Banking  System  Efficiency -3.43 -3.431 --- --- 6.980** 6.980 --- ---
(-1.20) (-0.973) (2.367) (0.996)
Financial  System Efficiency --- --- -3.036 -3.036 --- --- 12.148** 12.14
(-1.165) (-0.784) (2.378) (0.908)
Financial 
Activity 
Banking System Activity --- --- --- --- -37.75*** -37.75*** --- -53.86
(-4.321) (-3.920) (-1.485)
Financial  System  Activity --- --- --- --- --- --- -53.86**
(-2.192)
Financial
 Size
Dbacba -1.79 -1.79 1.171 1.171 3.075 3.075 12.211 12.21
(-0.348) (-0.204) (0.190) (0.102) (0.490) (0.343) (0.857) (0.560)
Hausman test 15.33*** 15.33*** 22.18*** 22.185*** 22.856*** 22.85*** 28.64*** 28.64***
OIR(Sargan) test 1.20 1.20 1.91 1.915 0.683 0.683 1.774 1.774
P-value [0.272] [0.272] [0.166] [0.166] [0.408] [0.408] [0.182] [0.182]
Cragg-Donald 7.167 --- 4.568 --- 7.413 --- 1.101 ---
Adjusted R² 0.174 0.174 0.149 0.149 0.177 0.177 0.096 0.096
F-Statistics 10.64*** 5.385*** 8.505*** 3.767** 9.212*** 13.88*** 2.94** 2.339*
Observations 193 193 196 196 191 191 196 196
(): z-statistics. Chi-square statistics for Hausman test. LM statistics for Sargan test. [ ]:p-values. Cragg-Donald Weak Instrument test. *, **, ***: significance 
levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on Central bank assets plus Deposit bank assets. Models with the “*” are in 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent standard errors(HAC).
Consistent with the analytical approach expressed for  Table 2, Table 3 addresses the two 
main issues. Firstly, rejection of the null hypothesis of the Hausman test  in all eight regressions 
validates  the  TSLS  estimation  technique.  While  the  significance  of  estimated  coefficients 
address the first issue, the second concern is fully addressed by the OIR test. Failure to reject the 
null hypothesis  in all  eight regressions shows that only financial  channels(in the presence of 
constant)  explain  the  redistributive  effect  of  income   conditional  on  aggregate  investment 
dynamics. In plainer terms, investment contributes to explaining income inequality through no 
other mechanisms than financial channels. This confirms the instruments are valid and the issue 
of endogeneity is no longer relevant as the investment dynamics are not correlated with the error 
term  in  the  unrestricted  equation  of  interest.  The  signs  of  estimated  coefficients  are  those 
expected and in accordance with the literature:  financial  depth(Kai & Hamori, 2009;Batuo et 
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al.,2010)  and financial  activity(Beck  et  al.,2004;  Beck et  al.,2007;Batuo  et  al.,2010).  As for 
others financial parameters, while those corresponding to financial size are insignificant at the 
10% level, financial efficiency substantially increases household income-inequality. An in-depth 
account of this new finding in the finance-inequality literature is covered as we revisit tested 
hypothesis below.
In revisiting the hypotheses we can assert the following. (1) Financial depth is good for 
the poor, in line with theoretical(Galor & Zeira,1993; Banerjee & Newman,1993)  and empirical 
(Beck et  al.,2004;  Beck et  al.,2007;  Kai  & Hamori,  2009;Batuo et  al.,2010)   literature.  We 
therefore confirm Hypothesis 1.  (2) Financial allocation efficiency has a disequalizing effect on 
income-distribution; implying policies designed to improve the allocation of mobilized funds to 
economic agents only benefit the rich to the detriment of the poor. Thus this finding confirms the 
Greenwood  and  Javanovic(1990)  inverted  U-shape  hypothesis  owing  to  the  relatively 
underdeveloped state of most countries in the sample. Drawing from Claessens & Perotti(2007), 
this disequalizing effect could be understood from the numbers on the size of loans and deposits 
per capita; which are substantially higher in lower income countries than in their higher income 
counterparts. This suggests higher  average loans and deposit values benefit only the wealthy and 
firms  for  the  most  part.  In  other  words,  formal  banking  services  are  limited  to  firms  and 
relatively rich households of countries in the sample. This finding  also supports  Asongu(2011c) 
who  postulates  that  financial  allocation  efficiency  significantly  undermines  inequality  adjusted-
welfare in the African continent. We therefore reject  Hypothesis 2. (3) Financial activity helps the 
poor. We confirm Hypothesis 3, that is consistent with theoretical(Galor & Zeira,1993; Banerjee & 
Newman,1993)and empirical(Beck et al.,2004; Beck et al.,2007;Batuo et al.,2010) literature.(4) 
The  fourth  hypothesis  is  that  financial  size  helps  the  poor.  The  estimated  coefficients  are  
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insignificant with the wrong signs. Therefore we conclude that financial size is not significantly anti-
poor. 
5. Conclusion
Owing to the lack of data on income-inequality for Africa, there are presently only two 
studies dedicated to the continent in the finance-inequality literature(Kai & Hamori, 2009;Batuo 
et  al.,2010).  While  these  papers  have  limited  their  analysis  to  few  financial  development 
indicators, the present work has contributed to this literature by integrating previously missing 
financial  and  investment  components  in  the  nexus.  The  results  broadly  indicate  financial 
development does not help the poor from all dimensions. While financial channels of depth and 
activity  are  good  for  the  poor  as  they  diminish  estimated  household  inequality,  financial 
intermediary allocation efficiency increases it. The findings on financial depth and activity are 
broadly consistent with empirical (Beck et al.,2004; Beck et al.,2007; Kai & Hamori, 2009;Batuo 
et  al.,2010)  and   theoretical(Galor  & Zeira,1993;  Banerjee  & Newman,1993) literature  which 
postulate  a  negative  and  linear  relationship  between  financial  development   and  income-
inequality.  On  the  other  hand  findings  of  financial  efficiency  are  in  line   the  Greenwood  and 
Jovanovic  (1990)  inverted  U-shaped  hypothesis  since  most  countries  in  the  sample  are  still  
undeveloped. 
As a policy implication, not all financial intermediary development dynamics are pro-poor.  
Thus  financial  sector  reforms  aimed  at  curbing  poverty  and  income-inequality  should  focus  on  
financial channels that matter in the development context. 
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis Obser.
Income Inequality(EHII) 45.128 5.140 29.033 64.360 -0.224 0.905 247
Domestic  Investment(GDI) 21.829 7.069 5.608 43.406 0.399 -0.003 288
Foreign Investment(FDI) 1.213 2.067 -7.125 10.294 1.338 4.383 275
Private. Investment(Priv.I) 13.607 5.234 2.303 34.516 0.146 0.301 281
Public Investment(Pub. I) 6.840 3.900 0.000 22.149 0.825 0.587 276
Openness(Trade) 69.245 36.366 22.303 205.13 1.409 1.312 289
Inflation 15.065 22.831 -4.140 200.03 5.570 37.228 297
Government Expenditure(G.E) 16.101 4.501 6.971 31.554 0.554 0.438 287
Population growth(Popg) 2.603 0.867 0.670 6.238 0.253 1.673 299
GDP growth(GDPg) 3.978 4.181 -10.240 19.450 0.109 1.399 286
Money Supply(M2) 0.377 0.212 0.046 0.830 0.589 -0.836 288
Liquid Liabilities(Fdgdp) 0.305 0.182 0.026 0.742 0.574 -0.840 286
Banking   Efficiency(BcBd) 0.766 0.407 0.070 2.259 1.070 1.274 294
Financial Efficiency(FcFd) 0.855 0.492 0.139 2.606 1.514 2.201 286
Banking Activity(Pcrb) 0.227 0.167 0.011 0.698 0.975 0.143 281
Financial Activity (Pcrbof) 0.269 0.238 0.011 1.325 1.996 4.844 288
Financial Size(Dbacba) 0.741 0.198 0.110 0.999 -0.702 0.238 273
S.D: Standard  Deviation.  Min : Minimum. Max : Maximum.  Obser : Number of  observations 
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Appendix 2 : Correlation Matrix
Instrumantal  Investment 
Variables Control  Variables
Financial Development  Variables Income 
InequalityFin.  Depth Fin.  Efficiency Fin. Activity F. Size
GDI FDI Priv.I Pub. I Trade G.E Popg Infl. GDPg M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba EHII
1.000 0.090 0.587 0.430 0.338 0.391 -0.154 -0.22 0.226 0.402 0.354 -0.074 -0.148 0.225 0.075 0.316 -0.297 GDI
1.000 0.089 0.024 0.358 0.057 0.007 -0.09 0.318 -0.047 -0.060 -0.208 -0.198 -0.158 -0.153 0.123 -0.022 FDI
1.000 -0.168 0.313 0.208 -0.217 -0.25 0.120 0.218 0.200 0.134 0.107 0.296 0.189 0.365 -0.271 Priv. I
1.000 0.085 0.210 -0.001 0.021 0.055 0.251 0.185 -0.202 -0.270 0.011 -0.125 -0.104 -0.161 Pub. I
1.000 0.392 -0.215 -0.14 0.308 0.026 0.074 -0.072 -0.129 0.001 -0.084 0.502 -0.041 Trade
1.000 0.084 -0.14 0.077 0.017 0.004 0.084 0.132 0.087 0.145 0.271 -0.021 G.E
1.000 0.237 0.041 -0.420 -0.458 0.096 0.068 -0.286 -0.231 -0.357 0.211 Popg
1.000 -0.026 -0.234 -0.244 -0.231 -0.180 -0.258 -0.202 -0.352 0.157 Infl.
1.000 -0.042 -0.053 -0.195 -0.208 -0.146 -0.170 0.031 -0.041 GDPg
1.000 0.976 -0.081 -0.011 0.693 0.563 0.306 -0.413 M2
1.000 -0.054 0.052 0.744 0.642 0.391 -0.375 Fdgdp
1.000 0.883 0.507 0.455 0.343 -0.060 BcBd
1.000 0.621 0.716 0.370 -0.055 FcFd
1.000 0.915 0.527 -0.366 Pcrb
1.000 0.494 -0.242 Pcrbof
1.000 -0.073 Dbacba
1.000 EHII
GDI: Gross Domestic Investment. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Priv.I: Private Investment. Pub.I: Public Investment. Trade: Openness. G.E: Government Final Expenditure. Popg: Population  
growth rate. GDPg: GDP growth rate. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial system credit on Financial system deposits. Pcrb: Private  
domestic credit by deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on Central bank assets plus deposit bank assets.  
EHII: Estimated Household Income Inequality. Fin: Financial.    
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Appendix 3: Variables definitions
Variables Sign Variable Definitions Sources
Income Inequality EHII Estimated Household Income Inequality UTIP, Kai and Hamori 
(2009)
Domestic Investment GDI Gross Domestic Investment (% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Foreign Investment FDI Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Private Investment Priv.I Gross Private Investment (% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Public Investment Pub.I Gross Public Investment (% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Openness Trade Imports(of goods and services) plus 
Exports(of goods and services) on GDP
World Bank(WDI)
Government Expenditure G. E General Government Final Consumption 
Expenditure (% of GDP)
World Bank(WDI)
Population growth Popg Average annual population growth rate World Bank(WDI)
Growth of GDP GDPg Average annual GDP growth rate World Bank(WDI)
Inflation Inflation Consumer prices (annual %) World Bank(WDI)
Economic financial 
depth(Money Supply)
M2 Monetary Base plus demand, saving and 
time deposits 
World Bank(FDSD)
Financial system 
depth(Liquid liabilities)
Fdgdp Financial system deposits  World Bank(FDSD)
Banking system 
allocation efficiency
BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank(FDSD)
Financial system 
allocation efficiency
FcFd Financial system credit on Financial 
system deposits 
World Bank(FDSD)
Banking system activity Pcrb Private credit by deposit banks World Bank(FDSD)
Financial system activity Pcrbof Private credit by deposit banks and other 
financial institutions 
World Bank(FDSD)
Financial size Dbacba Deposit bank assets on Central banks 
assets plus deposit bank assets
World Bank(FDSD)
GDI: Gross Domestic Investment. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Priv.I: Private Investment. Pub.I: Public Investment. Trade: Openness. G.E: 
Government Final Expenditure. Popg: Population growth rate. GDPg: GDP growth rate. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: 
Bank credit on Bank deposits.  FcFd: Financial system credit on Financial system deposits.  Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks.  
Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on Central bank assets plus deposit  
bank assets. EHII: Estimated Household Income Inequality. WDI: World Development Indicators. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure  
Database. UTIP:  University of Texas Inequality Project.
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